OXFORD, England, June 11 - Indian military forces are currently seeking to
remove a group of 600-800 Islamic guerrillas based in Kargil, on the Indian side of the
border separating India from Pakistani-held Kashmir. The conflict has heightened tensions
between Delhi and Islamabad -- both new nuclear powers -- and drawn the attention of the
international community to the status of Kashmir, which has long been disputed between
them. While neither side may wish to escalate the conflict, it is uncertain how far either
country is in
control of military activities on the ground. Moreover, neither country appears
sufficiently stable politically to restrain events.
The status of Kashmir has been hotly disputed between India and Pakistan since the
creation of both states during the 1947 partition. They have subsequently fought two wars
over the province and developed the most precarious of truces within it. An internal
insurrection in 1989 against Indian rule has made this fragile peace all the more
difficult to maintain. Every spring, guerrilla activities commence on the Indian side of
the Kashmir ``line of control'' and sporadic cross-border firing between the two sets of
military posts resumes. Events this spring have taken a somewhat different turn. Under the
cover of snow, a substantial group of Islamic guerrillas (believed to be Afghan Talibaan)
moved into the remote Kargil area, and laid claim to the ``liberation'' of 193 square
kilometres of ``Indian'' Kashmir. If allowed to remain on the land, they would effectively
shift forward the frontier of Pakistan's ``Azad'' (Free) Kashmir. In consequence, Indian
forces have launched a large-scale effort devoted to driving out the guerillas; they have
even resorted to aerial warfare not seen in Kashmir since the last full-scale military
conflict with Pakistan.
However, the terrain is difficult to navigate and, thus far, the guerrilla encampments
remain in place. Moreover, Pakistan is mounting a vigilant defence of its own borders and
has shot down several Indian Air Force jets which strayed into its airspace.There is a
serious danger that the conflict could escalate. To some degree, the conflict is already
intensifying, with cross-border fire now taking place regularly along the Kashmir line of
control. However,
neither Delhi or Islamabad wants to push the issue to outright war. The Lahore
Declaration, which offers a new period of amity between the two countries, was only
recently signed by Indian Prime Minister Atul Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani
counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Similarly, Pakistan's real strategic aim -- which is to bring
international arbitration to bear on the Kashmir question -- would not be well be served
if Islamabad were seen as the aggressor in the dispute. Indeed, Sharif has claimed no
prior knowledge of, and no military support for, the original incursion force.
Sharif and Vajpayee may not be fully in control of events and face domestic pressures to
assume aggressive postures. In Pakistan, three issues complicate the question:
- Sharif is attempting to consolidate his personal power in the face of considerable
opposition, particularly from the regions. He may believe that his position could be
significantly bolstered if he spearheaded the drive to achieve a deeply felt national
goal.
- Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has long enjoyed considerable
independence in strategic affairs, often adopting different positions from the government
and other parts of the military. ISI personnel have been seen in proximity to the
incursion
force and the agency may be precipitating the conflict for its own ends.- Sharif fears the
influence of the Talibaan in Afghanistan and has already made many concessions to the
movement. Rumours persist that an even larger Talibaan force (some 2,000-3,000 strong) are
ready to cross the Kashmir border to launch a jihad. If this were the case,
Sharif would be disinclined to stop them.- Vajpayee also faces domestic difficulties. He
heads both a Hindu nationalist party which is highly sensitive to security issues and an
interim government awaiting a general election in September. He does not want to be
perceived as a leader who might compromise the integrity of India's national frontiers.
His government has already incurred considerable popular opprobrium for allowing the
incursion to occur in the first place, apparently unnoticed until the spring snows melted.
Two army commanders have been dismissed and the position of Defence Minister George
Fernandes has become increasingly uncertain.A further complicating factor is that military
and air operations in the Kargil area -- conducted across mountainous terrain and over
ill-drawn frontiers -- are particularly likely to result in unforeseen ``incidents'' that
might escalate the conflict. For instance, the recent shelling of a school which resulted
in the deaths of 10
children raised popular calls for revenge. Nonetheless, forces arguing for restraint also
exist. In India, the criticism that the government has faced for permitting the incursion
is double-edged. The public is aware that the bombing and fighting is being conducted on
Indian territory. It may serve the parties in the interim government better to play down,
rather than adopt a belligerent stance, towards the present conflict. Adopting a moderate
stance could also improve Delhi's standing in the international community. Washington is
eager to limit the confrontation in order to secure the signatures of India and Pakistan
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by September. Delhi could gain important
support for some of its wider international goals (such as a U.N. Security Council seat)
if it adopts what the international community views as an intelligent position towards the
conflict. Moreover, Delhi's own strategy in Kashmir depends on the issue not becoming
``internationalised'' -- which requires the goodwill of the United States and would almost
inevitably happen if the present conflict becomes a war.Islamabad's strategic ambitions
are diametrically opposed. It is seeking to ``internationalise'' the issue -- and may have
been
encouraged to intensify the pressure on India by recent events in Kosovo. Pakistan is
heavily dependent economically on the United States and only recently avoided bankruptcy.
Washington thus far has shown no signs of reneging on its long-held opposition to assuming
a mediation role in Kashmir -- which would mean forcing Delhi to the negotiating table.
Islamabad is unlikely to have the means to change this. Moreover, Pakistan's other
principal foreign allies -- China and Saudi Arabia -- also have their own reasons for
wishing to see the conflict contained. With Tibet in mind, Beijing would not want Kashmir
to appear on any international agenda. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is aware that a war with
India would jeopardise the domestic security of India's 120 million Muslim
citizens.Ultimately, both sides have much more to lose than to gain from permitting the
conflict to escalate towards full-scale war. However, interest groups within each country
appear to have ambitions of their own which could sustain confrontation. Military
miscalculations on the ground could cause events to move in undesired directions.
The opinions expressed in this article represent the views of Oxford Analytica only. They
should not be seen as reflecting the views of Reuters.
Copyright 1999 Reuters Limited. |
